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INTRODUCTION 
Public policy is frequently used to induce individuals to contribute to public goods when it is in 
their private interests to avoid such contributions. To explore how individuals behave in various 
public goods decision settings and to gain insights into how institutions might be better designed 
to encourage the provision of public goods, economists employ laboratory experiments. The 
cornerstone of experimental investigations on the private provision of public goods is the 
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM). Understanding behavior in experimental 
implementations of the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism game is critical for the work of 
economists with institutional and policy-oriented interests. 
 
The standard linear VCM experiment places individuals in a context-free setting where the 
public good, which is nonrival and nonexcludable in consumption, is simply money. Participants 
are given an endowment of “tokens” to be divided between a private account and a public 
account. Contributions to the private account are converted to cash and given to the individual. 
Contributions to the public account yield a cash return to all group members, including the 
contributor. If the marginal return from contributing a token to the public account is less than the 
value of a token kept in the private account, but the sum of the marginal returns to the group is 
greater than the value of a token kept, the individually rational contribution is zero (i.e., the 
  
individual free rides) while the social optimum is realized when everyone contributes their entire 
endowment to the public account. 
 
In single-round VCM experiments where a public good contribution rate of zero is the unique 
Nash equilibrium, subjects contribute at levels far above this: on average, 40-60 percent of 
endowments. In repeated-round VCM experiments, contributions start in the range of 40-60 
percent but then decay towards zero (ending around 10 percent of endowments on average). 
Thus, there seem to be motives for contributing that outweigh the incentive to free ride. 
 
Possible motives underlying contributions include: (1) “pure altruism” (sometimes called “inter-
dependent utility”), which describes a situation in which an individual’s utility function is a 
function of his own payoff and the payoffs of her group members; (2) “warm-glow” (often called 
“impure altruism”; Andreoni, 1990), which describes a situation in which an individual gains 
utility from the simple act of contributing to a publicly spirited cause; and (3) “conditional 
cooperation” (Andreoni, 1988; Fischbacher et al., 2001), which is a predisposition to contribute 
in social dilemmas but punish by revoking contributions when significant free-riding behavior is 
observed. A fourth motive, which the VCM literature often ignores but we are particularly 
interested in, is “confusion”. We define confusion as behavior that stems from the failure of an 
individual to identify the dominant strategy of zero contributions. More broadly, confusion 
behavior results from a failure for individuals to discern the nature of the game, and individuals 
do not understand how to utility-maximize in the context of the game. 
 
  
Investigations into the identification and relative importance of various motives for contributions 
in the VCM game and closely related games have lead to conflicting conclusions. For example, 
Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) find statistical evidence of warm-glow but no evidence of pure 
altruism; Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) find the opposite. Fischbacher et al. (2001) and 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2004) find no evidence of pure altruism or warm-glow, but find 
significant conditional cooperation.  
 
Efforts to compare public goods contributions across different subpopulations have likewise lead 
to mixed results. A particularly well-studied issue is whether contributions behavior differs 
between men and women (Eckel and Grossman, 2005). Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) find 
that men contribute more than women. Nowell and Tinkler (1994) find females are more 
cooperative. Cadsby and Maynes (1998) find no significant differences between men and 
women.  
 
Particularly troubling is the apparent lack of correspondence between contributions behavior in 
experimental and naturally occurring settings. Whereas many studies find that economics 
students or economists are less likely to contribute to public goods in experiments (e.g., Marwell 
and Ames, 1981; Cadsby and Maynes, 1998), attempts at externally validating this claim yield 
contradictory results (Yezer, Goldfarb, and Poppen, 1996; Laband and Beil, 1999; Frey and 
Meier, 2004). Laury and Taylor (forthcoming) use behavior in a one-shot VCM experiment to 
predict behavior in a situation in which individuals can contribute to an urban tree planting 
program, a public good. Using the empirical approach of Goeree, Holt and Laury to estimate a 
  
pure altruism parameter for each subject, the authors find little or no relationship between 
subjects’ altruism parameters and subjects’ contributions to urban tree planting. 
 
There are several possible reasons for these puzzling results, including differences in the design, 
implementation, and participants used in these experiments. We focus on an alternative 
explanation: confusion confounds the interpretation of behavior in public goods experiments. 
This paper presents results from one new experiment and two previous experiments that use the 
“virtual-player method,” a novel methodology for detecting confusion through a split-sample 
design where some participants play with nonhuman players (automata) that undertake pre-
determined strategies or choices.  Each experiment involves a slightly different public goods 
game and a different subject pool (with presumably differing abilities). The level of confusion in 
all experiments is both substantial and troubling. These experiments provide evidence that 
confusion is a confounding factor in investigations that discriminate among motives for public 
goods contributions, in studies that compare behavior across subpopulations, in research that 
assesses the external validity of experiments, and in attempts to use experimental results to 
improve policy design. We conclude by proposing ways to mitigate confusion in standard public 
goods experiments, and present results from a pilot study that uses “context-enhanced” 
instructions.  
 
PRIOR EVIDENCE OF CONFUSION IN PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENTS 
Andreoni (1995) was the first to identify and test the hypothesis that confusion plays an 
important role in the contributions decisions of participants in public goods games. Specifically, 
Andreoni (1995, p. 893) hypothesizes “that the experimenters may have failed to convey 
  
adequately the incentives to the subjects, perhaps through poorly prepared instructions or 
inadequate monetary rewards, or simply that many subjects are incapable of deducing the 
dominant strategy through the course of the experiment.” To test his confusion hypothesis, 
Andreoni developed a VCM-like game that fixes the pool of payoffs and pays subjects according 
to their contributions to the public good. The person who contributes the least is paid the most 
from the fixed pool. Thus contributions to the “public good” in this game do not increase 
aggregate benefits, but merely cost the contributor and benefit the other group members. 
Andreoni uses behavior from the ranking games to infer that both other-regarding behavior and 
confusion are “equally important” motives in the VCM.  
 
Houser and Kurzban (2002) continued Andreoni’s (1995) work with a clever experimental 
design that includes: (1) a “human condition,” which is the standard VCM game; and (2) a 
“computer condition,” which is similar to a standard VCM game except that each group consists 
of one human player and three nonhuman computer players (which we refer to as “virtual 
players”) and the human players are aware they are playing with computer players. In each round 
the aggregate computer contribution to the public good is three-fourths of the average aggregate 
contribution observed for that round in the human condition.  By making the reasonable 
assumption that other-regarding preferences and confusion are present in the human condition, 
but only confusion is present in the computer condition, Houser and Kurzban find that confusion 
accounts for 54 percent of all public good contributions in the standard VCM game.  
 
Ferraro, Rondeau and Poe (2003) independently developed a similar design with virtual players, 
and applied it to a single-round VCM game. They find that approximately 54 percent of 
  
contributions are due to confusion. Ferraro and Vossler (2005) extend this design to the multi-
round VCM, where they find that 52 percent of contributions across rounds stem from confusion. 
However, unlike Hauser and Kurzban, they present evidence showing that this confusion does 
not decline with experience.  This difference stems from the atypical behavior that Hauser and 
Kurzban’s all-human condition exhibits (little decline in contribution) and two other aspects of 
their design that make it difficult to directly compare the human and computer conditions.1  
 
Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) developed an experimental design that, when combined with a few 
behavioral assumptions, allows the authors to separate the effects of pure altruism, warm-glow 
and confusion. Their design changes the standard VCM game by randomly assigning different 
rates of return from private consumption each round, which enables the measurement of 
individual contribution rates as a function of that player’s investment costs. The authors conclude 
that (p. 842) “altruism played little or no role at all in the individual’s decision and, on the other 
hand, warm-glow effects and random error played both important and significant roles.” While 
no point estimate was given of the proportion of contributions stemming from confusion in their 
experiment, the authors use their model results to predict that “well over half” of contributions in 
the seminal VCM experiments by Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) are attributable to error. 
 
Goeree, Holt and Laury use a VCM design in which group size is either two or four and the 
“internal” return of a subject’s contribution to the public good to the subject may differ from the 
“external” return of the same contribution to the other group members. The authors estimate a 
logit choice model of noisy decision-making with data from a series of one-shot VCM games (no 
feedback) in which the internal and external returns are varied. They find that coefficients 
  
corresponding to pure altruism and decision error are both positive and significant. Similar to 
Palfrey and Prisbrey, no estimate of the fraction of contributions due to confusion is given.  
 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2004) design an experiment to specifically test for the presence of 
conditional cooperation. In Fischbacher and Gächter’s “P-experiment,” they ask subjects to 
specify, for each average contribution level of the other group members, how much they would 
contribute to the public good. By comparing the responses in this experiment with those in their 
“C-experiment,” which is a standard VCM game with four-person groups, Fischbacher and 
Gächter argue that the most contributions are motivated by strong reciprocators. They find no 
evidence of pure altruism or warm-glow (no subjects stated they would contribute if other group 
members contributed zero). In contrast to previous work, they claim confusion accounts for a 
smaller fraction of observed contributions to the public good, “at most 17.5 percent” (p.3).  
 
Overall, four of the five studies above that assess magnitude find that about half of all 
contributions stem from confusion. This conclusion is alarming. In response to the fifth study, 
Ferraro and Vossler point out that Fischbacher and Gächter’s characterization of conditional 
cooperators also describes the behavior of confused “herders” who simply use the contributions 
of others as a signal of the private payoff-maximizing strategy. As such, the proportion of 
confusion contributions (17.5 percent) found by Fischbacher and Gächter may be best 
characterized as a lower bound estimate. Despite this dispute, the research on confusion in public 
goods experiments can be succinctly summarized: every study that looks for confusion finds that 
it plays a significant role in observed contributions.  
 
  
THE VIRTUAL-PLAYER METHOD 
The virtual-player method discriminates between confusion and other-regarding behavior in 
single-round public goods experiments, and discriminates between confusion and other-
regarding behavior or self-interested strategic play in multiple-round experiments (see Ferraro, 
Rondeau and Poe for other applications). The method relies on three important features: (1) the 
introduction of nonhuman, virtual players (i.e., automata) that are pre-programmed to exercise 
decisions made by human players in an otherwise comparable treatment; (2) a split-sample 
design where each participant is randomly assigned to play with humans (the “all-human 
treatment”) or with virtual players (the “virtual-player treatment”); and (3) a procedure that 
ensures that human participants understand how the nonhuman, virtual players behave.  
 
The virtual-player method makes each human subject aware that he or she is grouped with 
virtual players that do not receive payoffs and that make decisions that are exogenous to those of 
the human.  Thus the method neutralizes the other-regarding components of the human 
participant’s utility function and the motives for strategic play.2 Thus, as long as participants 
understand their decision environment, any contributions made by humans in virtual-player 
groups can be attributed to confusion in the linear VCM game. 
 
The random assignment of participants to an all-human group or a virtual-player group allows 
the researcher to net out confusion contributions by subtracting contributions from (human) 
participants in the virtual-player treatment from contributions in the all-human treatment. In 
single-round experiments where the decisions of other players are not known ex ante, the 
contributions from virtual players should have no effect on human contributions nor should they 
  
confound any comparison between all-human and virtual-player treatments. Thus, one can argue 
that randomly selecting the profile of any previous human participant, with replacement, as the 
contribution profile for a virtual player suffices to ensure comparability.  
 
However, in the typical multiple-round public goods game where group contributions levels are 
announced after each period, it is important to exercise additional control as the history of play 
may affect contributions in the virtual-player treatment. Indeed, Ferraro and Vossler find that 
confused individuals use past contributions of virtual players as signals of how much to 
contribute. The additional control comes by establishing that each human in the all-human 
treatment has a human “twin” in the virtual-player treatment: each twin sees exactly the same 
contributions by the other members of his group in each round. Thus, the only difference 
between the two treatments is that the player in the virtual-player treatment knows she is playing 
with pre-programmed virtual players, not humans.  
 
To illustrate, consider a game that involves repeated interactions with groups consisting of three 
players. Participants in a group in the all-human treatment are labeled as H1, H2 and H3.   
Subject V1 in the virtual-player treatment plays with two virtual players: one that makes the 
same choices H2 made in the all-human treatment, and the other that makes the same choices H3 
made. Likewise, player V2 plays with two virtual players, one playing exactly like human 
subject H1 and the other playing exactly like H3. And so on. Note that having an imbalance 
between all-human and virtual-player treatments, which would occur if some participants do not 
have a “twin” or if a player in one treatment has multiple twins in other, confounds comparisons. 
 
  
To ensure that participants in the virtual-player treatment believe the virtual-player contributions 
are truly pre-programmed and exogenous, each subject has a sealed envelope in front of her. The 
participants are told that inside the envelope are the choices for each round from the virtual 
players in their groups. At the end of the experiment, they can open the envelope and verify that 
the history of virtual group member contributions that they observed during the experiment is 
indeed the same as in the envelope. The subjects are informed that the reason we provide this 
envelope is to prove to them that there is no deception: the virtual players behave exactly as the 
moderator explained they do. Post-experiment questionnaires are useful at assessing whether 
participants fully understand the nature of virtual players.  
 
APPLICATION OF THE VIRTUAL PLAYER METHOD TO THE GOEREE, HOLT, 
AND LAURY EXPERIMENT 
The experiment of Goeree, Holt, and Laury (hereafter referred to as “GHL”) is a variant of the 
static linear VCM game that endeavors to test the significance and magnitudes of contributions 
stemming from pure altruism and warm-glow. Each participant decides how to allocate 25 tokens 
between a private and a public account in each of ten “one-shot” decision tasks (referred to as 
“choices” in instructions), without feedback, where the internal (mI) and external rates (me) of 
return, and group size (n), vary across tasks. For each decision task, a token kept in the private 
account yielded five cents. The internal rate of return refers to the marginal return to oneself 
from a token contributed to the public account, and ranged from two to twelve cents. The 
external rate of return refers to the marginal return to other players from one’s contribution to the 
public account, and was either two or four cents. Group size was either two or four players. 
  
Formally, the profit function of the individual i (in cents) for a particular decision task is given 
by 
∑
≠
++−=
n
ji
jeiIii xmxmx )25(5π  
where xi ∈ [0, 25] denotes public account contributions from player i. Since the internal rate of 
return in GHL is always lower than the value of a token kept, it is still the individual’s dominant 
strategy to contribute nothing. The sum of the external and internal rates of return is always 
greater than five cents, so that full endowment contribution maximizes group earnings.  
 
In the typical one-shot VCM, the external and internal rates of return are equal (mI = me), i.e. all 
players receive the same return from the public good. The rates are varied in the GHL design 
because participants exhibiting pure altruism should increase their contributions when the 
external return or the group size increases. Such systematic correlations should be identifiable by 
observing patterns in individual contributions across the various decision settings. If considerable 
contributions are observed, but they show little correlation with external return and group size, 
the conjecture is that contributions are largely attributable to warm glow. 
 
We replicate the GHL experiment using the virtual-player method to explore whether 
conclusions drawn from the original study are robust after quantifying and netting out confusion 
contributions.  We made two small changes in the way subjects were grouped and paid.  GHL 
assign subjects to two- and four-member groups by selecting marked ping-pong balls after all 
decisions are made. We pre-assign participants to two- and four-member groups based on their 
subject ID number. This is important for virtual-player sessions as it allows us to give each 
participant an envelope with the aggregate contributions of other players as well as earnings from 
  
virtual player contributions for each possible decision selected. The pre-assignment into groups 
shortens the length of both all-human and virtual-player treatments.  GHL randomly choose only 
one of the ten decisions to be binding using the roll of a ten-sided die and use a second, unrelated 
experiment to supplement earnings.  Rather than engage our participants in a second experiment, 
we pay participants based on three randomly chosen decisions instead of one. This change 
increases the saliency of each decision. 
 
Experiment instructions are presented both orally and in writing. The instructions for all-human 
and virtual-player treatments are included as Appendix A. The all-human instructions are from 
GHL, with minor revisions. The virtual-player instructions are similar with the exception of 
emphasizing that participants are matched with virtual players, whose contributions are pre-
determined. As in GHL, participants make decisions via paper and pencil.  Decision sheets are 
identical to GHL. Following the decisions, a post-experiment questionnaire is given to collect 
basic demographic information as well as to assess understanding of the experimental design and 
decision tasks.  
 
Fifty-three participants were recruited from a pool of undergraduate student volunteers at the 
University of Tennessee in the Spring of 2005. Twenty-three students participated in the all-
human treatment, which serves as a replication of the GHL design, whereas thirty students 
participated in the virtual-player treatment.3 Experiment sessions consisted of groups ranging 
from four to twelve people, and participants were visually isolated through the use of dividers. 
Matching was anonymous; subjects were not aware of the identity of the other members of their 
  
group(s). All sessions took place in a designated experimental economics laboratory. Earnings 
ranged from $8 to $15 and the experiment lasted no more than one hour. 
 
RESULTS 
Goeree, Holt and Laury Application 
 
Table 1 presents mean and median contributions from the all-human treatment, which serves as a 
replication of the GHL study. The pattern of contributions in relation to design factors is quite 
similar between this study and the GHL study, with contributions generally increasing with 
respect to external return and group size. This suggests that pure altruism is an important motive. 
 
To formally quantify the magnitude of altruism and warm-glow, GHL consider different 
theoretical specifications for individual utility and estimate utility function parameters using a 
logit equilibrium model. For the sake of parsimony, we refer the interested reader to the GHL 
study for details. We estimate logit equilibrium models with our data and concentrate on 
interpretations of estimated parameters and comparisons of parameters across treatments.  
 
Estimated logit equilibrium models are presented in Table 3 for all-human and virtual-player 
treatments. The “altruism” model considers the altruism motive but not warm-glow, the “warm-
glow” model considers warm-glow but not altruism, and the “combined” model considers both 
motives. Consistent with the contributions pattern observed in Table 1, the logit equilibrium 
model results for the all-human treatment suggest that pure altruism is an important motive.  In 
particular, the parameter α is a measure of pure altruism, and we find this parameter to be 
statistically different from zero using a five percent significance level. Our estimates suggest that 
  
a participant is willing to give up between five cents (“altruism” model) and fifteen cents 
(“combined” model) in order to increase another person’s earnings by $1. The parameter g 
measures warm-glow, which we find to be insignificant. The parameter µ is an error parameter. 
While µ measures dispersion and does not indicate the magnitude of confusion contributions, 
statistical significance of this parameter does indicate decision error is present (Goeree, Holt, and 
Laury). Estimates of µ are indeed statistically different from zero at the five percent level for 
each specification.  
 
Overall, the main conclusions drawn from GHL carry over in our all-human treatment model: 
pure altruism and confusion are important motives behind contributions whereas warm-glow is 
not. We now discuss the outcome from the virtual-player treatment and present two main results 
about the role of confusion.   
 
Result 1.  
Positive contributions stem largely from confusion and subjects use experimental parameters as 
cues to guide payoff-maximizing contributions, leading to behavior that mimics behavior 
motivated by pure altruism. 
 
Contributions in the virtual-player treatment, presented as Table 2, are generally smaller than in 
the all-human treatment but not strikingly so. Specifically, mean contributions across all decision 
tasks are 6.7 tokens or 27 percent of endowment in the virtual-player treatment as compared to 
8.8 tokens or 35 percent in the all-human treatment. Put another way, virtual-player contributions 
are approximately 75 percent of all-human contributions. Assuming that other-regarding 
  
preferences and confusion are present in the all-human treatment, but that only confusion exists 
in the virtual-player treatment, this suggests that an alarming 75 percent of all-human treatment 
contributions stem from confusion.  
 
Perhaps more startling is the observed correspondence between all-human and virtual-player 
treatment contributions across decision tasks, as illustrated in Figure 1. From this Figure, one 
observes that subjects in the virtual treatment alter their contributions based on the same stimuli 
as subjects in the all-human treatment; the two response patterns are parallel such that the 
difference between sets of contributions across decision tasks are approximately equal.  
 
Turning to the Logit equilibrium models estimated from virtual-player treatment data, we find 
that estimated pure altruism parameters are statistically different from zero. In particular, we find 
that a participant is willing to give up between four cents (“altruism” model) and sixteen cents 
(“combined” model) in order to increase a virtual player’s earnings by $1.  Using the estimated 
“altruism” and “combined” models from the two treatments we test for equality of altruism 
parameters between the two (leaving other parameters unconstrained) using Wald Tests. For both 
specifications we fail to reject the hypothesis of equal altruism parameters (“altruism” model: χ2 
= 0.647, p = 0.421; “combined” model: χ2 = 0.033, p = 0.855).  Of course, by design, 
participants in the virtual-player treatment are not exhibiting pure altruism, unless one believes 
pure altruism includes preferences over the utility of fictional automata. 
 
 Why would virtual-player participants respond to the same stimuli as all-human treatment 
participants? Confused subjects are using the changes in the parameters across decision tasks as a 
  
cue of how to behave.  The altruism parameter is picking up confusion about the role of the 
external return in the subject’s private payoff function.  In a confusing situation, most people 
look for cues to direct them towards the optimal behavior.  In the GHL experiment, subjects have 
to make ten contributions decisions for which the internal and external rates of return, and group 
size, are all changing.  It should not be surprising that a confused subject will infer meaning from 
the changes in these parameters and decide that her behavior ought to change in response to 
them. This behavior is similar in spirit to the “herding” behavior found in the Ferraro and 
Vossler dynamic VCM experiment.  In this experiment, subjects use past group member 
contributions (human or nonhuman) as a cue of how to choose their own optimal responses. 
 
Recall that Laury and Taylor (forthcoming) run subjects through a GHL experiment and then ask 
participants to contribute to an urban tree-planting program. Subjects with positive altruism 
parameters are found to be less likely to contribute to the naturally-occurring public good, even 
after controlling for experimental earnings and subject demographics and attitudes.  Based on our 
logit equilibrium model results and observed correspondence between contributions both virtual-
player and all-human treatment contributions to changes in the MPCR, it is quite likely 
confusion confounds their comparison. 
 
Result 2.   
The common observation in public goods experiments that contributions increase with increases 
in the Marginal Per Capita Return likely results from subject confusion rather than altruism or 
expectations about the minimum profitable coalition. 
 
  
Decision Task 4 and Decision Task 6 involve a group size of four.  The internal return is equal to 
the external return, but these returns increase from two to four across the two tasks. Thus, the 
lone design difference is analogous to a change in the marginal per capita return (MPCR) in 
standard VCM experiments. In particular, the MPCR doubles from 0.4 to 0.8 from Decision Task 
4 to Decision Task 6. A “stylized fact” from the experimental public goods literature is that an 
increase in the MPCR increases contributions, which has been attributed to altruism and 
"minimum profitable coalitions" (Cox and Sadiraj, 2005).4 In the all-human treatment, mean 
contributions are 5.2 in Decision Task 4 and 9.9 in Decision Task 6 – an increase of 4.7 tokens –, 
which is consistent with the results on MPCR changes in the literature. In the virtual-player 
treatment, contributions go from 2.7 to 7.7, which is a nearly identical change of 5.0 
tokens. Thus our results are consistent with the "MPCR effect" being related to confusion.  
 
Such pervasive evidence of confusion may cause readers to doubt the validity of the virtual-
player method. In addition to the emphases placed in the instructions and the use of the sealed 
envelope, we also used a post-experiment questionnaire. We asked all subjects to answer the 
following question: “If all you cared about was making as much money as possible for yourself, 
how many tokens should you have invested in each decision? (you may not have cared about 
making as much money as possible for yourself, but if you did, what is the correct answer?).” 
Subjects were aware that they would be paid $1.50 for a correct answer.  Thirteen out of fifty-
three answered this question incorrectly, suggesting that 25 percent of respondents were unable 
to discern the dominant strategy of zero contributions after participating in the experiment (note 
that this is a lower bound given that some subjects may only realize the correct answer after 
  
being asked the question and, as noted in Ferraro and Vossler, other subjects who erroneously 
believe they are playing an assurance game will often answer “zero” to this question).  
 
For those in the all-human treatment we asked respondents to state the contributions level that 
would have maximized group earnings. All participants correctly stated 25 tokens or full 
endowment. Thus, it appears that an important issue with the public goods game is that some 
self-interested individuals are simply not able to deduce the dominant strategy. Since decision 
errors can only be made in one direction (contributions are non-negative), this confusion 
necessarily leads to what looks like other-regarding behavior. 
  
Ferraro, Rondeau, and Poe 
We draw from previous experiments to strengthen our arguments about the confusion problem in 
public goods experiments. The first experiment is from Ferraro, Rondeau and Poe, who use the 
virtual player method to study behavior in a single-round VCM-like game. Group size is twenty-
one, individual endowment is $12, MPCR is $0.07, and there is a cap on returns from the public 
good of $7 each. Thus, while the social optimum is for the group to contribute $100 (divided 
equally this is $4.76 each) – rather than full endowment – the dominant strategy is still for the 
individual to contribute nothing.  
 
This study uses “Ivy League”, Cornell University undergraduates from an introductory 
economics class, whom all have prior experience in experiments. Total sample size is 85. As 
stated by Ferraro, Rondeau and Poe (p. 103), “our subject pool can be considered an ‘extreme’ 
environment in which to search for altruistic preferences: subjects were ‘economists in training,’ 
  
operating in an environment in which self-interest was being reinforced.” Results from this 
experiment are presented in Table 4. Using the entire sample, all-human treatment contributions 
are $2.14 and virtual-player treatment contributions are $1.16, such that we estimate confusion 
accounts for 54 percent of contributions. Thus, even with some of the world’s brightest young 
individuals as subjects, it appears as though confusion contributions are quite substantial.  
 
As discussed in the Introduction, public goods experiments are often used to make inferences 
about the behaviors of subgroups in the population (by gender, race, culture, etc.).  We use raw 
data from this experiment to further analyze behavior according to gender (not reported in the 
original article).  Table 4 presents mean contributions by gender and treatment. Based on the all-
human treatment results, contributions from females are $0.92 higher than males and this 
difference is statistically significant using a Mann-Whitney Test (p = 0.07). However, virtual-
player treatment contributions are also larger for females by $1.24 (p < 0.01). Thus, most of the 
purported difference between genders disappears when confusion contributions are removed 
($0.93 for males versus $0.61 for females). What appears like a gender-effect is likely a gender-
based difference in confusion for this specific sample. 
  
Ferraro and Vossler  
The other prior experiment we draw upon is from Ferraro and Vossler, who apply the virtual-
player method to the dynamic VCM game. They use an archetype multiple-round VCM game 
with group size of four, an MPCR of 0.5, and feedback on group contributions after each round. 
Subjects are undergraduate students from Georgia State University. The sample consists of 160 
subjects: 80 in an all-human treatment and 80 in a virtual-player treatment.5  
  
 
Figure 2 presents mean contributions (measured as a percentage of endowment) by round for the 
all-human and virtual-player treatments. The first observation is that confusion contributions are 
considerable. With participants contributing 32.5 percent and 16.8 percent of endowment in the 
all-human and virtual-player treatments, respectively, this suggests 52 percent of total 
contributions in the standard VCM game stem from confusion. Second, while the virtual-player 
treatment contributions do decrease over rounds, average contributions still amount to 10 percent 
of endowment in Round 25.  
 
Ferraro and Vossler carefully analyze the data using a dynamic pooled time-series model and 
find that the reduction in contributions in the virtual-player treatment is largely driven by the 
decline in observed contributions from virtual players in previous rounds. Thus, the standard 
decay in VCM experiments over rounds is not due to learning the dominant strategy or a 
reduction in confusion. Instead, similar to the correlation between MPCR and confusion 
contributions in our GHL application, confused participants in the virtual-player treatment 
simply use any available cue to help determine contributions. As additional validation of this 
result, Ferraro and Vossler report responses to a question similar to the one in our GHL 
experiment concerning what the purely self-interested, dominant strategy is. They find that 30 
percent of respondents are unable to determine the dominant strategy of zero contributions, and 
additional evidence from the post-experiment questionnaire and focus groups suggests that this 
proportion is a lower bound. 
 
  
DISCUSSION 
Through the course of three different applications of the virtual-player method, we find that at 
least half of contributions in public goods games stem from confusion. This finding in itself may 
not seem alarming, given that decision errors are likely rather commonplace in many economics 
experiments. Unfortunately, these confusion contributions do not simply amount to harmless 
statistical noise. In particular, we have shown that confusion contributions are sensitive to 
changes in design parameters, distort inferences about the role of other-regarding preferences, 
and confound comparisons between subpopulations. Furthermore, confusion just does not simply 
go away over the course of many repeated rounds. Overall, these results call into question the 
internal and external validity of this line of experimentation.  
 
Do our results suggest we should just stop drawing inferences from public goods experiments? 
Certainly not, but they do suggest we need to rethink how these experiments are implemented. 
As a starting point for discussion, recall that Andreoni (1995) cites three potential causes of 
confusion contributions: (1) inadequate monetary rewards; (2) poorly prepared instructions; and 
(3) the inability of participants to decipher the dominant strategy.  
 
Are inadequate monetary rewards a problem? We think not. Experiments discussed here involve 
payoffs that are on average much higher than student wages for this time commitment. Further, 
in an investigation of “house money” effects, Clark (2002) found that having subjects play the 
VCM game with their own money had no discernible effect on their behavior. The results of 
Clark are consistent with the presence of a substantial number of individuals who are not clear 
about the appropriate strategy conditional on their preferences.   
  
 
Are instructions “poorly prepared”? For the experiments discussed that use the virtual-player 
method, the instructions are standard in experimental economics. The decision settings are 
presented using neutral language, effort is made to avoid context, and subjects go through simple 
exercises to assess their understanding of payoff computations. From our experience, the vast 
majority is quite capable at performing the necessary payoff calculations. Thus, while our 
instructions – and instructions for public goods experiments in general – are not necessarily 
poorly prepared from the purview of experimental economics standards, the inability of 
individuals to decipher the dominant strategy does suggest the need for modifying how the game 
is explained.    
 
Responses from post-experiment questionnaires we used, as well as behavior, suggest that at 
least 30 percent of respondents simply are not able to figure out the dominant strategy of zero 
contributions. Ferraro and Vossler report in a post-experiment focus group that just one-fourth of 
participants were able to figure out the dominant strategy by reading the instructions. This has 
important consequences for the external validity of the experiment unless one can show 
confusion has similar effects and magnitudes in “real world” contributions. We believe, 
however, that when faced with a naturally occurring contributions decision, people recognize the 
tension between privately beneficial free-riding and socially beneficial contributions. 
 
Our results thus call into question the standard, “context-free” instructions used in public goods 
games. Standard instructions for this type of experiment use neutral language and do not reveal 
that the experiment is about public goods or that participants are being asked to make a 
  
contributions-like decision. Indeed, the focus group of Ferraro and Vossler reveals that many 
participants thought they were playing some sort of assurance game.6 We share the sentiment of 
Lowenstein (Lowenstein, 1999:  p. F30), who suggests “Subjects may seem like zero intelligence 
agents when they are placed in the unfamiliar and abstract context of an experiment, even if they 
function quite adequately in familiar settings.”  
 
Our experimental evidence suggests that a bit of context could go a long way. In particular, since 
many subjects cannot figure out the dominant strategy (but all our GHL experiment participants 
figured out the social optimum) perhaps we can clue them in without altering their preferences 
for the public good. For instance, we could explain to participants that we are asking them for 
voluntary contributions for a public good and that the public good is simply an amount of money 
that gets distributed throughout the group. Subjects can be informed that it is perfectly 
reasonable to give nothing. 
 
As a pilot study, one of the authors used such context-enhanced instructions in a standard, 10-
round VCM experiment run in two sections of an undergraduate environmental economics 
course at the University of Tennessee in September 2005. These instructions are included as 
Appendix B. The experiment was being used to illustrate the free-riding phenomenon (before the 
concept was formally introduced). After students read the instructions but before contribution 
decisions were made, the students were asked to write down the dominant strategy. Only three of 
25 students (12 percent) failed to identify the dominant strategy of zero contributions (mean 
response was 0.4 tokens). This figure is considerably below those from comparable, context-free 
experiments: 30 percent from the post-experiment questionnaire in our GHL experiment, and the 
  
estimate from Vossler and Ferraro that three-fourths could not deduce the dominant strategy 
prior to the experiment.    
 
The pattern of contributions is quite similar in both class sections: contributions start at about 50 
percent and fall to 40 percent by Round 10. This rate of decay is quite low for a VCM 
experiment, but results are consistent with expectations based on our virtual-player treatment 
results. Confused, herding individuals are going to follow the group trend and so any reduction 
in contributions in early rounds really causes a downward spiral: conditional cooperators get an 
exacerbated signal of free-riding and revoke contributions, herders then further reduce, and so 
on. Without the herders, the decay in average contributions over time should be relatively less 
steep. 
 
While there are likely tradeoffs associated with adding even generic context, namely that it could 
systematically alter participant preferences for the welfare of others, it appears that investigation 
into instruction-based modifications is warranted. Consistent with our conjecture, the findings of 
Oxoby and Spraggon (this volume) suggests that confusion also may be reduced by providing a 
payoff table showing the subjects’ payoffs given their decisions and the decisions of others. Note 
that the standard VCM instructions provide information only on the payoffs associated with each 
level of group contributions. The value of instruction enhancements could be tested using the 
virtual-player method, through survey questions with monetary rewards for correct answers, 
through debriefing sessions, and through external validity tests.  
 
  
In conclusion, we believe that public good experiments will continue to play an important role in 
testing economic theory and designing public policies. However, they cannot achieve their full 
potential as long as they are implemented in a way that leaves many subjects oblivious to the 
social dilemma that experimentalists are trying to induce. Without innovation in the design of 
these experiments, our ability to draw inferences about behavior in collective action situations, 
and about the effects of alternative institutional arrangements that induce private contributions to 
the public goods, will continue to be impaired. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 The two design flaws are: (1) human subjects in the computer condition observe their group members aggregate 
contribution before they make their decision in a round, as opposed to after they make their decision, as in the 
human condition; and (2) the automata contribute the average of what human condition members contributed. If the 
history of contributions affects both confused and other-regarding subjects, and if participants behave differently 
when the contributions of other players are known ex ante, then such changes in design affects the comparability of 
the two conditions. Indeed, the intent of our virtual player method is to simply have participants play with virtual 
players and not change any other aspect of the game. 
 
2 A similar use of virtual players was employed by Johnson et al. (2002) in a sequential bargaining game. 
 
3 In one session, a graduate student was asked to participate as a last-minute measure to make the total number of 
participants divisible by four. This individual was subsequently dropped from the data set. Due to the nature of the 
game, this inclusion of this person should have no impact on the contribution level of the undergraduate participants. 
 
4 Davis and Holt (1993) define a “minimal profitable coalition as “the smallest collection of participants for whom 
the return from contributions to the [public account] exceed the return from investing in the private [account]” (p. 
332). 
 
5 We only report their “VI” and “HI” treatments. 
 
6 An Assurance Game (also known as the Stag Hunt) is a game in which there are two pure strategy equilibria and 
both players prefer one equilibrium (payoff dominant) to the other.  The less desirable equilibrium, however, has a 
lower payoff variance over the other player’s strategies and thus is less risky (it is risk-dominant).  In the case of the 
VCM game, some subjects erroneously view contributing their entire endowment as the most desirable strategy 
when everyone else in the group contributes their endowments too.  Subjects described this decision as “risky” 
because it leads to low payoffs if other players do not contribute their endowments.  Contributing zero was viewed 
as a payoff inferior choice but “less risky.”  These subjects were unable to infer the dominant strategy in the VCM 
game. 
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Table 1. GHL Application, All-Human Treatment Results 
 
 Decision Task 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Group Size 4 2 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 2 
Internal Return 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 2 4 
External Return 2 4 6 2 6 4 6 2 6 12 
 
Mean 9.2 10.1 10.8 5.2 9.7 9.9 6.5 5.2 8.7 12.3 
Median 5 10 11 4 9 9 5 3 6 12 
 
 
  
Table 2. GHL Application, Virtual-Player Treatment Results 
 
 Decision Task 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Group Size 4 2 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 2 
Internal Return 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 2 4 
External Return 2 4 6 2 6 4 6 2 6 12 
 
Mean 6.1 6.9 9.1 2.7 7.7 7.7 4.4 4.1 7.2 10.8 
Median 5 6 7 0 7.5 5.5 2 3.5 5 10.5 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. GHL Application, Estimated Logit Equilibrium Models 
 
 All-Human Treatment Virtual-Player Treatment 
 Altruism Warm-Glow Combined Altruism Warm-Glow Combined 
α 
 
0.054* 
(0.021) 
- 0.148* 
(0.064) 
0.034* 
(0.014) 
- 0.163* 
(0.050) 
g 
 
- -0.470 
(0.769) 
-1.583 
(1.059) 
- -1.231 
(0.796) 
-2.383* 
(0.987) 
µ 
 
19.310* 
(3.447) 
32.382* 
(11.628) 
28.269* 
(9.054) 
11.914* 
(1.460) 
24.801* 
(7.150) 
21.132* 
(5.311) 
Log-L -671.497 -673.071 -668.718 -824.510 -823.148 -813.308 
N 230 230 230 300 300 300 
Note: standard errors in parentheses.  
* indicates parameter is statistically different from zero at the five percent level. 
 
  
Table 4. Ferraro, Rondeau and Poe (2005) VCM Experiment, Mean Contributions 
 
   All Males Only Females Only 
All-Human Treatment   2.14 1.77 2.69 
Virtual-Player Treatment   1.16 0.84 2.08 
Difference   0.98 0.93 0.61 
% Confusion Contributions   54% 47% 78% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1. GHL Application, Comparison of All-Human and Virtual-Player Contributions 
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Figure 2. Ferraro and Vossler (2005) Experiment, Mean Contributions 
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APPENDIX A 
 
All-Human Treatment Instructions (Unformatted) 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment about decision making. You will be paid for participating, and the amount 
of money you earn depends on the decisions that you and the other participants make. At the end 
of today’s sessions you will be paid privately and in cash for your decisions. A research grant has 
provided the funds for this experiment. 
 
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the experiment. 
Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions 
private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant.  
 
You have already earned $3 simply for arriving on time. All the money that you earn after this 
will be yours to keep, and your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of today’s 
experiment. 
 
This experiment 
In this experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices about how to allocate a set of 
tokens. You and the other subjects have been randomly assigned to groups, and you will not be 
told each other’s identities. 
 
In every choice you will be told how many people are in your group. In each choice you will 
have 25 tokens to allocate. You must choose how many of these tokens you wish to keep and 
how many tokens you wish to invest. The amount of money that you earn depends on how many 
tokens you keep, how many tokens you invest, and how many tokens the others in your group 
invest.  
 
Examples of choices you will make in this experiment 
 
Each choice that you make is similar to the following: 
 
Example 1: You are in a group of size 2 (you plus one other). Both of you have 25 tokens to 
allocate. You will earn 5 cents (i.e., $0.05) for each token you keep. For each token you invest, 
you will earn 4 cents and the other person will earn 3 cents (a total of 7 cents for both of you 
together). 
 
For each token the other person keeps, this person will earn 5 cents. For each token the other 
person invests, this person will earn 4 cents and you will earn 3 cents (a total of 7 cents for the 
group). 
 
  
To summarize, you will earn: 
5 cents times the number of tokens you keep 
+ 4 cents times the number of tokens you invest  
+ 3 cents times the number of tokens the other person in your group invests. 
 
Number of tokens to keep: _____   Number of tokens to invest:  _____  
(These choices must sum to 25 tokens) 
You can choose any number of tokens to keep and any number to invest, but the total number of 
tokens you keep plus the number of tokens you invest must sum to the total number of tokens you 
have been given to allocate. 
 
Please feel free to use your own calculator, or one provided by the experimenter, to verify 
earnings and to ensure that all tokens have been allocated. 
 
To be sure you understand how your earnings would be calculated in this example, please fill out 
the following: 
 
If I keep ____ tokens and invest _____ tokens; and the other person in my group invests ____ 
tokens, I will earn: 
_____ cents for the tokens I keep (5 cents each) 
_____ cents for the tokens that I invest (4 cents each) 
_____ cents for the tokens the other person invests (3 cents each) 
For a total of: _____ cents. 
 
Please fill this out, and we will come to each of you individually to answer any questions that 
you have and to check your answers. When you are done, you may proceed to the second 
example: 
 
Example 2: You are in a group of size 4 (you plus 3 others). Each of you has 25 tokens to 
allocate. You will earn 5 cents for each token you keep. For each token you invest, you will earn 
2 cents and each of the other three people in your group will earn 3 cents (a total of 11 cents for 
all four of you together). 
 
For each token another person in your group keeps, this person will earn 5 cents. For each token 
this person invests, this person will earn 2 cents, and each of the other three people in the group 
will earn 3 cents (a total of 11 cents for the group). 
 
To summarize, you will earn: 
5 cents times the number of tokens you keep 
+ 2 cents times the number of tokens you invest  
+ 3 cents times the number of tokens the other people in your group invests. 
 
Number of tokens to keep: _____         Number of tokens to invest:  _____  
(These choices must sum to 25 tokens) 
 
Again, to be sure you understand how your earnings would be calculated in this example, please 
fill out the following: 
  
 
If I keep ____ tokens and invest _____ tokens; and the other three people in my group invest a 
total of  ____ tokens, I will earn: 
_____ cents for the tokens I keep (5 cents each) 
_____ cents for the tokens that I invest (2 cents each) 
_____ cents for the tokens the other three people invest (3 cents each) 
For a total of: _____ cents 
 
Earning money in this experiment 
 
You will be asked to make ten allocation decisions like the examples we have just discussed. We 
will calculate your earnings as follows: 
 
After all of your decision sheets have been collected, we will verify that everyone has completed 
all decisions and that all 25 tokens have been allocated for each choice. Then we will roll a ten-
sided die twice. The numbers that appears on the die will determine which two of your decisions 
we will carry out. For example, if we roll a 3 you will be paid for your third decision. If we roll a 
0 you will be paid for your 10th decision (the die contains numbers 0 through 9). You will be 
paid only for the decisions that you and the other people in your group made for these two 
decisions. For example, if a 1 and 7 are rolled you will be paid based on the decisions that you 
and the others in your group made for decision 1 and for the decisions that you and the others 
made for decision 7. You will not be paid for any other decisions. 
 
Prior to this experiment we randomly assigned everyone, based on ID numbers, to a group of 
size four and a group of size two. The decision chosen will determine whether your earnings will 
be based on the group of size four or the group of size two.   
 
For each decision chosen, you will then earn money based on the number of tokens you kept in 
this decision, the number of tokens you invested in this decision, and the number of tokens 
invested by the other(s) in your group (the total number invested by each other person in your 
group) in this decision.  
 
We will return an earnings report to you so that you may see how much money you earned in 
this portion of the experiment. You will only be told the number of tokens invested by the 
other(s) in your group. You will not be told who you are matched with. 
 
During the experiment, you are not permitted to speak or communicate with the other 
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, please raise your hand and 
one of us will come to your station to answer it.   
 
On the following pages are the ten choices we would like you to make. Please fill out the form, 
taking all the time you need to be accurate. When everyone has made all ten decisions we will 
collect the forms. 
 
At the end of the experiment you will be asked a short series of questions about the experiment. 
 
  
Virtual-Player Treatment Instructions (Unformatted and Abridged) 
 
Instructions 
[Identical to those in the human treatment] 
 
This experiment 
In this experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices about how to allocate a set of 
tokens. You will be in groups for this experiment. Your group will consist of yourself and 
“Virtual Players”. The decisions for the Virtual Players in your group have been pre-determined. 
Your decisions will have no effect on how the Virtual Players behave. To assure you that the 
decisions of the Virtual Players have indeed been predetermined and will not change during the 
experiment, we have envelopes in which the investment decisions of the Virtual Players in your 
group are printed on a piece of paper. We will place these envelopes on your desk. AFTER the 
experiment is over, you may open your envelope and confirm that it contains the decisions made 
by the Virtual Players in your group. PLEASE DO NOT OPEN THE ENVELOPE UNTIL THE 
EXPERIMENT IS COMPLETED.   
 
In every choice you will be told how many members are in your group. In each choice you will 
have 25 tokens to allocate. You must choose how many of these tokens you wish to keep and 
how many tokens you wish to invest. The amount of money that you earn depends on how many 
tokens you keep, how many tokens you invest, and how many tokens the Virtual Players in your 
group invest. 
 
Behavior of the Virtual Players in your Group 
The Virtual Players in your group are not real students, but they behave as if they were real 
students. University of Tennessee students have gone through this same experiment, but in their 
experiment all of the group members were human. To program the behavior of the Virtual 
Players in your group, the investment decisions of humans in a previous experiment were 
selected, and each Virtual Player is set to behave in the same way that one of the humans 
behaved in the previous experiment. Thus, the Virtual Players are non-human, but they will 
behave as specific humans have behaved in the same experiment in the past. In other words, the 
Virtual Players in your group are investing as if they were endowed with 25 tokens for each 
choice and can choose to invest or keep them at the same rates of return which you will be 
offered.  
 
Remember, your group is you and Virtual Players. None of the other students in the laboratory 
are in your group; they are working in different groups with different Virtual Players. Your final 
earnings for the experiment will depend on your decisions and the decisions of your Virtual 
group members. 
 
  
Examples of choices you will make in this experiment 
 
[The examples are identical to those in the human treatment instructions, except that any 
reference to other players have been replaced by explicit references to Virtual Players.  The 
modification to the first example is given below.] 
Each choice that you make is similar to the following: 
 
Example 1: You are in a group of size 2 (you plus one Virtual Player). Both of you have 25 
tokens to allocate. You will earn 5 cents (i.e., $0.05) for each token you keep. For each token you 
invest, you will earn 4 cents and the Virtual Player will “earn” 3 cents (a total of 7 cents for both 
of you together). 
 
For each token the Virtual Player has chosen to keep, the Virtual Player will “earn” 5 cents. For 
each token the Virtual Player has chosen to invest, the Virtual Player will “earn” 4 cents and you 
will earn 3 cents (a total of 7 cents for the group). 
 
Earning money in this experiment 
 
[This section is the same as in the human treatment, except again all references to other 
players have been replaced by references to Virtual Players] 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX B 
 
Instructions for the “Context-Enhanced” VCM Experiment (unformatted) 
 
Instructions for Public Goods Experiment 
 
In this experiment you will be asked to make contributions towards the provision of a public 
good, similar to the decision you face when asked to give money to a particular cause. The 
public good here is simply an amount of money that gets paid to all participants in the room. 
Know that, similar to typical contribution situations you face, it is okay for you to contribute 
nothing. The experiment consists of approximately ten decision “rounds”. Each round is 
independent from the others but follow the same procedures. 
 
In each round, each participant receives an initial income of ten tokens. Your task is to allocate 
the 10 tokens between your private account and the group account. Indicate the number of tokens 
you wish to contribute to the group account on the appropriate “decision sheet” provided to you.  
 
Tokens placed in your private account are yours to keep. Tokens placed in your group account 
go towards the production of the public good. Specifically, after each round, the experimenter 
will calculate the sum of all contributions made to the group account. The aggregate level of 
public good provision will be determined by multiplying by 5 the total amount of contributions 
received. This amount will then be equally divided between all participants. Note that your 
decisions will be kept private and everyone receives an equal share of the public good regardless 
of their individual contribution. This payment to each participant is the “return from the public 
good.” The total amount contributed, aggregate provision, and individual return from the public 
good will be announced after each round. 
 
You must keep a personal record of your debits and credits using the attached record sheet. 
Decision sheets will be retained so that these sheets may be audited after the experiment is 
completed. The tokens you earn in each round are equal to the tokens you put in your private 
account plus your return from the public good. At the end of the experiment the number of 
tokens earned will be converted into dollars. The exchange rate will be 4 cents for each token. At 
the conclusion of the experiment I will randomly select four individuals to be paid their earnings 
from the experiment in cash. 
 
 
  
Public Goods Experiment Record Sheet 
 
Name:  
 
Subject ID: 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Round 
 
Income Contribution to 
Group Account
Return from 
Public Good 
Earnings for Round 
(2) – (3) + (4) 
1 10 tokens    
2 10 tokens    
3 10 tokens    
4 10 tokens    
5 10 tokens    
6 10 tokens    
7 10 tokens    
8 10 tokens    
9 10 tokens    
10 10 tokens    
Total     
Cash 
Earnings Total Tokens *$0.04 =
 
 
  
 
